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ABSTRACT
The evolution of drone technology in the past nine years
since the first commercial drone was introduced at CES 2010
has caused many individuals and businesses to adopt drones
for various purposes. We are currently living in an era in
which drones are being used for pizza delivery, the shipment of
goods, and filming, and they are likely to provide an alternative
for transportation in the near future. However, drones also pose
a significant challenge in terms of security and privacy within
society (for both individuals and organizations), and many
drone related incidents are reported on a daily basis. These
incidents have called attention to the need to detect and disable
drones used for malicious purposes and opened up a new
area of research and development for academia and industry,
with a market that is expected to reach $1.85 billion by 2024.
While some of the knowledge used to detect UAVs has been
adopted for drone detection, new methods have been suggested
by industry and academia alike to deal with the challenges
associated with detecting the very small and fast flying objects.
In this paper, we describe new societal threats to security and
privacy created by drones, and present academic and industrial
methods used to detect and disable drones. We review methods
targeted at areas that restrict drone flights and analyze their
effectiveness with regard to various factors (e.g., weather,
birds, ambient light, etc.). We present the challenges arising in
areas that allow drone flights, introduce the methods that exist
for dealing with these challenges, and discuss the scientific
gaps that exist in this area. Finally, we review methods used
to disable drones, analyze their effectiveness, and present their
expected results. Finally, we suggest future research directions
and discuss whether the benefits from the decision to allow
drones to fly in populated areas are actually worth the risk.
I. INTRODUCTION
"Terror by Joystick" [1], [2], [3]and "Eyes in the Skies "
are examples of topics that have been provided by the media
as a means of describing the malicious impact of drones
today. There is no doubt that drones are a game-changing
technology in terms of security and privacy, and have become
a growing societal threat in recent years. Just a decade ago,
drones were considered a technology restricted for use by
official authorities such as the military, police, etc. However, in
the nine years since the first commercial drone was presented
at CES 2010 by Parrot, many sectors have begun to use
drones (including the private sector), and drone shipments are
expected to reach 805K by 2021 due to their reasonable price
and diverse uses.
In addition to their increased adoption by the industrial and
private sectors [4], [5], [6], drones have also been adopted
by many entities for various malicious purposes, and drone
related incidents are reported on a daily base [7], [8], [9], [10],
[11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16]. The volume of drone related
incidents will likely increase further along with the expected
growth in drone shipments in the coming years [17], [18] and
the new "open sky" policy adopted by many countries (US
[19], UK [5], New Zealand [4]) which allows drones to fly
over populated areas.
The growing number of incidents has highlighted the need
to detect and disable drones that are maliciously used by their
operators and has created a new avenue of drone research and
development for academia and industry focused on anti-drone
methods. The anti-drone market is expected to reach $1.85
billion by 2024 [20], and many solutions have already been
suggested by researchers and companies to: (1) detect nearby
drones and issue alerts about their presence, and (2) disable
them. While some of the knowledge used to develop these
solutions was adopted from the related area of UAV detection,
many other methods have been developed specifically for
drones due to the challenges that arise from their small size
and versatility which make detecting and disabling them more
difficult than detecting and disabling a UAV.
In this paper, we discuss security and privacy in the era
of drones. First, we describe new threats that drones pose
to society and future threats that are on the horizon due to
recent technological improvements. We review methods to
detect drones in areas that restrict drone flights and analyze
their effectiveness with regard to various factors (e.g., weather,
birds, ambient light, etc.). We continue by describing two
new challenges that have arisen in areas that allow drone
flights, and review existing methods for dealing with these
challenges and discuss the scientific gaps that exist in this area.
In addition, we review methods to disable drones, analyze their
effectiveness, and present their expected results . At the end
of this paper, we suggest future research directions that should
be investigated in order to improve societys ability to handle
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2the threats posed by drones.
Contribution While a SoK in this area has already taken
place [21], [22], [23], [24], [25], [26], [27], we consider
previous attempts very limited compared to our SoK, because
(1) they either ignore industry methods [21], [22], [23], [24],
[25], [26] or academic methods [24], [27], (2) they don’t
review methods to deal with the challenges that arise from
allowing drones to fly over populated areas [21], [22], [23],
[24], [25], [24], [26], and (3)they are limited in scope, failing
to review the large number of methods covered in this paper
or analyze their effectiveness. In our SoK, we review 120
methods proposed by the academic and industrial sectors that
were designed to detect and disable drones flying in areas
where drone presence is restricted, as well as areas where
drones are allowed. We compare the methods’ effectiveness at
drone detection. We also present the scientific gaps that exist
as a result of allowing drones to fly over populated areas and
discuss future research directions.
Structure The remainder of the paper is structured as
follows: in section II, we describe drone types, architecture,
and functionality. In section III, we discuss the current threats
posed by drones. In sections IV and V, we review methods
that have been proposed by the academic and industrial sectors
to detect drones in restricted areas (e.g., critical infrastructure,
airports) and in non-restricted areas (e.g., countries that ap-
ply an "open skies" policy). Methods to disable drones and
countermeasures are reviewed in section VI, and in section
VII, we discuss areas in which there is a scientific gap and
propose future research directions.
II. DRONES - BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide the relevant background required
for the rest of the paper. Drones are multirotor aircraft operated
by a controller. Drones are sometimes named according to the
number of rotors they have: tricopter, quadcopter, hexacopter,
and octocopter are frequently used to refer to three, four, six,
and eight rotor rotorcraft, respectively. In this paper, we refer
to all of them as drones. Until 2010, drones were built by
amateurs and used primarily by hobbyists for fun. In the nine
years since the first commercial drone was presented by Parrot
at CES 2010, drones have been adopted by industry for various
purposes [4], [5], [6] and are considered by many as a game-
changing technology that is here to stay. In the subsections that
follow, we describe drone types, architecture (communication,
sensors, and functionalities), and use. Understanding drone
technology and capabilities is important for appreciating the
challenges they create and developing methods for detecting
and disabling them. In the next subsection II-A, we introduce
the categories of commercial drones. In this paper, we focus
on three categories: Nano, Micro, and Mini Drones. In the
subsequent subsections II-B, II-C, II-D we provide necessary
information about their architecture; in subsection II-E, we
discuss the ways each type of drone is currently used.
A. Types & Categories
Various organizations (NATO, DoD , NASA, State Regu-
latory Authority) have defined groups or classes of drones.
TABLE I
TYPES OF DRONES
Category Weight OperatingAltitude Range Payload
Nano <0.2 kg <90 90 m <0.2 kg
Micro 0.25-2 kg <90 m 5 km 0.2-0.5 kg
Mini 2-20 kg <900 m 25 km 0.5-10 kg
Small <150 kg <1500 m 50-100 km 5-50 kg
Tactical >150 kg <3000 m >200 km 25-200 kg
Most classification has been made based on weight, altitude, or
speed. While classification differs among these organizations,
the most common classification system used (based on drone
weight) defines five groups of drones: Nano, Micro, Mini,
Small, and Tactical. Table I presents the weight, payload, and
range for each of these groups. Nano drones (e.g., Eachine
E10C, Holy Stone HS210) are smaller than a human hand.
Macro (e.g., DJI Spark, DJI Mavic, Parrot Bebop 2) and Mini
(e.g., DJI Matrice 600 Pro, DJI Inspire 2) are larger, as can be
seen in Figure 1 which presents Mini (DJI Matrice 600 Pro),
Micro (Parrot Bebop 2), and Nano (DJITello) drones next to
a can of Coke. Small and Tactical drones are the size of a
motorcycle/helicopter and are used for military purposes and
will likely provide an alternative for transportation (manual
[28] and automatic [29], [30]) in the future. In this paper, we
focus on Nano, Micro, and Mini drones that are mainly used
for civilian purposes.
B. First-Person View (FPV) Channel
Modern drones provide video piloting capabilities (an FPV
channel) based on radio signals, in which a live video stream
is sent from the drone’s video camera to the pilot (operator)
via a GCS (ground control station) on the ground (dedicated
controller, smartphone, VR glasses, smartwatch). The FPV
channel enables the pilot to fly the drone as if he/she was on
board (instead of looking at the drone from the pilot’s actual
ground position). The FPV channel also allows an operator to
control a drone using a GCS. A typical FPV channel consists
of an uplink and a downlink, as demonstrated in Figure 2.
A video downlink is used for video streaming using data
that is captured by the drone’s camera and sent to the pilot’s
GCS screen. The video streaming process usually consists of
digitization of the captured picture to binary representation by
a CMOS sensor, which is followed by video compression,
encryption, and modulation. Real-time protocols for video
streaming are used for these purposes. The second channel,
referred to as an uplink, is largely used for C&C of the
drone, and the uplink process usually consists of digitizing the
joystick’s movements (or smartphone) to binary commands,
which is followed by encryption and modulation. By its nature,
the amount of data that is sent over a video downlink is much
greater than that sent by a remote control downlink.
There are two types of technologies dominating the FPV
market: Wi-Fi FPV and analog FPV, and two types of tech-
nologies dominating the FPV market: Wi-Fi FPV and analog
FPV [31]. A Wi-Fi FPV drone is basically a flying router with
no Internet connectivity. Such drones open a flying router with
3Fig. 1. Mini (DJI Matrice 600 Pro), Micro (Parrot
Bebop 2) and Nano (DJI Tello) drones compared to
the size of a Coca-Cola can.
Fig. 2. FPV channel - downlink and uplink.
TABLE II
OSI MODEL OF DJI SPARK (WI-FI FPV DRONE)
Layer 7 - Application Linux
Layer 6 - Presentation RTPLayer 5 - Session
Layer 4 - Transport UDP
Layer 3 - IP IPv4
Layer 2 - Data Link IEEE
802.11nLayer 1- Physical
no Internet connectivity. Such drones open a network (access
point) that allows the drone and its controller to communicate.
Wi-Fi is by far the most popular method used to include FPV
in budget RC drones (according to [31], [32]), because: (1)
any Android/iOS smartphone (or tablet) on the market can
be used to operate the drone, (2) the only additional hardware
required is a Wi-Fi FPV transmitter (which is connected to the
camera of the drone), instead of an additional controller with
a screen that is equipped with a dedicated radio transceiver
which is required by other FPV types (e.g., 2.4/5.8 GHz
analog FPV), (3) drone manufacturers can boost the Wi-Fi
FPV drone flight range up to four kilometers (e.g., DJI Spark)
using dedicated hardware, and (4) Wi-Fi FPV drones support
4K resolution. Some drone types are considered pure Wi-Fi
FPV drones (e.g., DJI Spark, DJI Phantom 3 SE, Parrot Bebop
2), and other types of drones contain Wi-Fi FPV along with
their dedicated analog FPV (e.g., DJI Mavic pro, DJI Mavic
Air). Almost every FPV-enabled drone selling for less than
$100 uses Wi-Fi FPV [31], and there are dozens of kinds
of Wi-Fi FPV drones available for purchase [33], [34], [35],
ranging from $30 to hundreds and thousands of dollars. Table
II presents the OSI model of the DJI Spark. Analog FPV
requires a dedicated GCS for mediation between a drone and
a smartphone (that is used as a screen), and therefore drones
with analog FPV are more expensive than those with Wi-Fi
FPV. However, analog FPV drones can reach a distance of up
to seven kilometers from their GCS (using dedicated amplifiers
and remote controllers), supporting flight ranges of up to eight
kilometers (DJI Matrice 600 Pro).
C. Sensors
The following sensors can be found in most of the com-
mercial drones sold by the three biggest commercial drone
manufacturers (DJI, Parrot and Yuneec).
• Motion Sensors – Accelerometers, gyroscopes, and mag-
netometers provide nine dimensions of freedom and are
used by the drone for stabilization.
• 4K/Full HD Video Camera – Such cameras are used to
capture video and still images.
• GPS Device – This device is used by the drone for
localization and automatic navigation.
• Barometer – This measuring device is used by the drone
to calculate its altitude during flight.
• Collision Avoidance System – Recent DJI drones are
equipped with vision systems based on monocular cam-
eras and ultrasonic sensors in order to sense dangers in the
vicinity of the drone. Skydio [36] uses computer vision
algorithms that obtain data from 13 integrated cameras
for this task.
D. Functionality
• Automatic Maneuvering – Allows the operator to mark
a target/trajectory via the GCS, around which the drone
will automatically maneuver itself according the given
input, based on its GPS device.
• Follow Me – Allows the operator to mark a moving object
via the GCS monitor, which the drone will automatically
maneuver itself to follow. This functionality is mainly
used by a drone operator that is on the move and cannot
control the drone due to the nature of his/her activity
(e.g., skiing, bicycling, running, etc.); the follow me
functionality is based on computer vision algorithms that
detect the moving object by processing the captured video
stream.
• Return to Home (RTH) – Allows automatic maneuvering
of the drone to a predefined home target and landing
based on a GPS device. This method is automatically
operated when the connection between the drone and its
GCS has stopped or been disabled.
• Smart Capture – Allows the ability to control the drone
using hand gestures captured by the drone’s camera
during flight. This functionality eliminates the need for
using a GCS and is based on computer vision algorithms
that interpret hand gestures and translates them to ma-
neuvering commands. This feature is only supported by
DJI drones.
4TABLE III
COMPARISON OF TOP COMMERCIAL DRONES
FPV Functionality Characteristics
Manufacturer Name Wi-Fi Analog FollowMe RTH
Automatic
Navigation
Smart
Capture
Flight
Range
(km)
Speed
(km/h)
Flight
Time
(m)
Weight
(g)
Altitude
(km)
Video
Resolution Date
Price
($)
DJI
Matrice
600 Pro ! ! ! ! 5 65 32 -38 9500 2.5-4.5 4K 2016 4999
Mavic 2
Pro ! ! ! ! ! ! 8 72 31 907 6 4K 2018 1499
Spark ! ! ! ! ! 2 50 16 300 4 1080p 2017 399
Inspire 2 ! ! ! ! 7 94 23-27 3440 2.5-5 4K 2016 2999
Phantom
4 Pro ! ! ! ! ! 7 72 30 1388 4K 2016 1499
Mavic
Air ! ! ! ! ! ! 2 68.4 21 430 5 4K 2018 799
Tello ! 0.1 28.8 13 80 0.1 720p 2018 99
Parrot Bebop 2 ! ! ! ! 2 64 30 525 0.1 1080p 2017 399
Anafi ! ! ! ! 4 53 25 312 4 4K 2018 599
Yuneec
Mantis Q ! ! ! ! 1.5 70 33 479 4K 2018 499
Typhoon
4K ! ! ! ! 0.6 30 25 200 0.1 4K 2015 499
Typhoon
H Plus ! ! ! ! 1.2 48 30 1995 0.5 4K 2018 1899
Skydio R1 ! ! 0.1 40 16 997 0.1 4K 2018 1999
Rabing Rabing Mini ! 0.1 20 10 90 0.1 720p 2017 70
HASAKEE H1 ! 0.05 20 7 50 0.05 0.3MP 2018 83
Holy Stone HS190 ! 0.05 15 7 25 0.05 0.3MP 2017 35
TOZO Q2020 ! 0.045 12 8 50 0.045 NO 2017 60
E. Uses
Many individual entrepreneurs, small businesses, large com-
panies, and local authorities have begun to realize the potential
of drones and started to adopt drones for various purposes.
Regulations are constantly changing in order to support this
revolution, allowing drones to fly over populated areas and
carry packages [37], [19]. Drone use varies according to
the drone’s capabilities. Table III presents a comparison of
the capabilities of the top selling Mini, Macro, and Nano
drones. As can be seen from the table, Mini drones (e.g.,
DJI Matrice 600 Pro, DJI Inspire 2) can reach a range of
up to seven kilometers and support flight times of up to 38
minutes. They are also capable of delivering small packages
(e.g., DJI Matrice 600 Pro can carry up to seven kilograms).
This type of drone is about to provide an alternative means for
delivering a package and many firms launched pilots around
the world for delivering goods (e.g., Amazon [5], UPS FedEx
[38]), pizza (Dominos [4]), and emergency healthcare (drugs,
blood supply). This type of drones is also used in agriculture
(for automatic aerial spraying of liquid pesticides, water, and
fertilizers [39]) and by militaries [40], [41]. Micro Drones can
reach the same flight’s range as Mini drones, however they are
very limited in their carrying primarily used for professional
filming and photography by local authorities (e.g., for disaster
management, geographic mapping), law enforcement (e.g.,
by police, border patrol officers), professional photographers
(e.g., media, film industry), and contractors [42], [43], [44].
The range of Nano drones is limited to 100 meters, and they
are considered drones for amateurs. Most of them do not
support cutting-edge functionality that is integrated in Mini
and Micro drones. Some of them do not even contain an
integrated camera. However, a recent development in this area
showed that Nano drones can be used for military purposes
for targeted assassination in a battlefield [45].
III. MALICIOUS DRONE USES
The current generation of drones provides FPV capabilities
that allow operators to fly drones in areas located up to eight
kilometers from the operator’s location; this can be done both
manually and automatically. In addition, modern drones are
very small, and they can reach speeds of up to 65 kilometers
per hour and carry up to six kilograms. The capabilities that
were identified by industry and encouraged this sector to adopt
drones for various legitimate purposes [4], [5], [6], [43] have
also been identified by malicious entities that misuse drones
for illegitimate purposes. The cutting-edge technology and low
price of drones made them accessible to individuals, resulting
in an increase in drone sales; this has created new threats
and caused the number of drone related incidents to rise
significantly in recent years. In this section, we describe the
major threats that drones pose to security and privacy today.
A. Spying and Tracking
The FPV channel provides excellent infrastructure for a
malicious operator to spy on people without being detected
because: (1) it eliminates the need for a malicious operator
to be close to the drone or target by allowing the operator to
maneuver the drone from far away to a target that is also far
away from the operator’s location, (2) it can be secured using
encryption, and (3) it supports HD resolutions that enable the
attacker to obtain high quality pictures and close-ups (by using
the video camera’s zooming capabilities) that are captured by
the drone, even when the drone is far from the target POI. In
addition to the abovementioned, the presence of drones is no
longer restricted in populated areas [19], [37]. Exploiting these
facts, drones have increasingly become a threat to individuals’
privacy as evidenced by their use to detect a cheating spouse
[7], film random people [8], [9] and celebrities [10], and take
intimate pictures of neighbors [11]. In addition, empty houses
5TABLE IV
THREATS MAPPED TO TYPES OF DRONES
Privacy PhysicalAttacks Crime
Cyber
Attacks
Video
Streaming
Carrying
Surveillance Equipment
Nano ! Targetedassassination [45]
Targeting homes
for burglaries [46]
Micro !
3D mapping using
radio transceiver [47]
MITM attacks against
cellular networks [48]
Tracking a person according
to his/her devices [49]
Carrying radioactive
sand [50]
Smuggling goods
into prison yards [12]
Mini ! ! Carrying a bomb [16];colliding with an airplane [51], [52]
Hijacking radio
controlled devices [53], [24]
Smuggling goods between
countries [13], [14], [15]
Establishing a covert
channel [54], [55]
Swarm ! ! Multiple casualtyincidents [56] Cyber warfare [57]
have also been targeted by burglars for robberies using drones
[46].
Drones can also provide a means of carrying a surveillance
device. Several studies have shown that drones equipped
with radio transceivers can be used for (1) locating and
tracking people across a city [49] by extracting unencrypted
information from the lower layers of the OSI model of
radio protocols (e.g., Wi-Fi and Bluetooth) that reveal the
MAC addresses of their device’s owners (e.g., smartphones,
smartwatches) [58], (2) 3D through-wall imaging with drones
[47], and (3) performing an MITM attack on telephony [48]
by downgrading 4G to 2G. Drones can also be used to carry
traditional spying devices used to eavesdrop on a conversation
(e.g., a laser microphone [59]) and perform keylogging (e.g.,
using a microphone).
B. Smuggling
Commercial drones provide optimal infrastructure for smug-
gling due to their flight range, size, speed, and carrying ca-
pabilities. The abovementioned reasons make drone detection
very difficult and have caused criminals to adopt drones for
smuggling purposes. Drones are currently used for dropping
weapons and other contraband into prison yards [12], and
smuggling goods [14], [15] and drugs between countries
over borders [13]. In terms of smuggling, using a drone has
two major benefits: (1) it eliminates the need for a human
smuggler, and (2) even if a smuggling drone is detected and
caught, determining the identity of its operator (who might be
located a few kilometers from the target) remains a challenge.
C. Physical Attacks
Exploding and shooting drones are no longer relegated to
science fiction. We are now living in an era that was referred
to as “terrorism by joystick” by a few sources [1], [2], [3].
The reasons that led criminals to adopt drones for smuggling,
have also led terrorists to adopt drones for various purposes.
Just recently, the Venezuelan president was the target of an
assassination attempt conducted by two drones while speaking
at an event to mark the 81st anniversary of the national
army [16]. In 2015, two people were arrested in two different
incidents for crashing a DJI Phantom into a tree on the south
lawn of the White House [60] and for landing a ‘radioactive’
drone on the Japanese Prime Minister’s roof [50]. These acts
have raised many questions about the ability to protect a world
leader from an aerial targeted assassination.
Targeting a world leader is not the only threat that drones
pose. Drones can cause much greater disasters in terms of the
number of casualties by exploding into critical infrastructure.
This type of threat was demonstrated by the Greenpeace orga-
nization which crashed a Superman shaped drone into a French
nuclear plant [61]. Multiple casualty incidents resulting from
explosive drones targeting crowds represent another increasing
concern [62], [63], [64]. This threat has been demonstrated in
(1) an armed drone attack conducted by unspecified terrorists
against Russian military bases in Syria [56]. Commercial
airliners are also vulnerable to exploding and colliding drone
attacks during takeoff and landing [65]. This threat led to the
cancellation of hundreds of flights at Gatwick Airport near
London, England, following reports of drone sightings close
to the runway [52]. The recent Gatwick incident is probably
the most famous drone airport incident due to the volume
of its damage, however there are dozens of reported near
miss incidents involving drones all around the world, and
recently such incidents have begun to be reported on weekly
and monthly base [51].
D. Launching a Cyber Attack
Cyber-attacks deemed in the past as infeasible due to
distance, line of sight, and other factors can now be performed
using a drone. Two studies [54], [55] showed how to establish
a covert channel for data infiltration [54] and exfiltration [55]
to/from an organization. In these studies, the drone was used to
carry a transmitter (in [54]) and a receiver (in [55]), in order to
modulate/demodulate data sent to/from malware installed on
an air-gapped network of a target organization. Other studies
have shown that a drone equipped with a radio transceiver can
be used to hijack a Bluetooth mouse [24] to gain access to
a wireless office printer [66]; perform wireless spoofing and
deauthentication attacks on a targeted user [53]; and hijack
a Philips Hue smart bulb [57]. Many other known attacks
can also be performed from a drone equipped with proper
hardware, such as speakers (for triggering smart assistants
6Fig. 3. Ideal detection scheme for restricted areas.
[67], [68]) and radio transceivers (for exploiting WPA-2 [69]
and Bluetooth [70] vulnerabilities).
E. Summary & Challenges in the Near Future
Table IV maps threats to types of drones. The potential harm
from the abovementioned threats is likely to be amplified in the
near future when a malicious operator will be able to operate
a swarm of drones simultaneously to perform his/her task,
turning a targeted cyber-attack against an organization into
cyber warfare and a targeted assassination into a massive terror
attack. In addition, many sci-fi scenarios that were unrealistic
due to technological limitations are now real. For example,
shooting drones have already been documented [71], and they
can be used by criminals to rob banks [72] and individuals
[73].
IV. MALICIOUS DRONE DETECTION IN RESTRICTED
FLIGHT AREAS
In this section, we describe methods to detect drones flying
over areas that are restricted to flight. Various geofencing
methods used to detect the location of a nearby consumer
drone have been introduced in the last few years, and the
global anti-drone market size is anticipated to reach $1.85
billion by 2024 [20]. Geofencing methods are very effective at
detecting a malicious object in areas that restrict unauthorized
entries such as military bases, prisons, etc. These methods
can be used to detect drones that are used for purposes of
dropping weapons and other contraband into prison yards
[12], smuggling goods and drugs between countries over
borders [13], and crashing on the White House lawn [60],
[74]). Some geofencing methods have been adopted from
prior military knowledge for detecting UAVs and airplanes.
However, as indicated by [75], drones are much harder to
detect than manned aircraft, so new dedicated methods have
been suggested to deal with the challenges that arise from
detecting a small, high-speed object flying in the air. The
difficulty in detecting drones is an issue modern armies, police
departments, and governments are aiming to overcome, as it is
a recognized threat to critical infrastructure, operations , and
individuals.
In this section, we describe dedicated methods used to
detect Nano, Micro, and Mini drones. Small and Tactical
drone detection methods are not covered here , because
the challenges associated with detecting Nano, Micro, and
Mini drones are different than those associated with detecting
Small and Tactical drones, and many existing mechanisms
for the detection of Small and Tactical drones are ineffective
for detecting Nano, Micro, and Mini drones. A number of
considerations need to be taken into account when evaluating
a detection method. Many factors, including ambient light,
weather, false positive rates, ambient noise, cost, line of sight,
and detection range influence the effectiveness of each method.
In this section, we analyze each method’s effectiveness at
dealing with issues important for securing a restricted area
from the presence of drones. Another question that we address
is whether the suggested method can be used for drone
identification (i.e., detecting the drone type).
We consider facilities such as airports, jails, and military
bases as restricted facilities. They are considered sensitive
or dangerous due to the nature of the activity performed at
the facility and the danger posed from physical and cyber-
attacks against them. These kinds of facilities are largely
isolated from urban environments and considered no-fly areas
for drones. Ideally, drone flights are prohibited from a wider
perimeter beyond the restricted area; we consider this area a
safety perimeter, however it may vary according to physical
limitations, local aviation authorities, and regulations. A safety
perimeter is required to prevent attackers from spying and
triggering a cyber-attack against the restricted area. Beyond
the safety perimeter, there is also a detection perimeter in
which drones are allowed to fly; the area within the detection
perimeter must be monitored so that a flying drone that
enters the safety perimeter is detected early enough. The ideal
detection scheme is presented in Figure 3.
Commercial drones are programmed to avoid entering a no-
fly area by automatically landing on the ground or returning to
a user-defined home coordinate before entering such a zone.
They contain an internal database of no-fly areas defined by
polygons of GPS coordinates. The functionality that prevents
drones from flying over no-fly areas is extremely important
and prevents operators from accidentally entering a no-fly
area, however malicious operators can bypass this functionality
using counter mechanisms that are sold online.
A. Radar
Monostatic radar (transmitter and receiver are collocated)
is a traditional method of drone detection which detects the
electromagnetic waves (EM) reflected from objects in order
to determine a drone’s range, speed, and velocity. However,
the detection of the smallest consumer drones requires high-
frequency radar systems, since drones reflect in a frequency
of 10Ghz [76], and can evade low-frequency systems [60].
Several studies analyzed monostatic radar (35 GHz [77] and
9.4 GHz [78]) to detect the distance of a nearby drone.
Another study [79] showed that distinguishing between a
drone and a bird can done using machine learning algorithms,
by extracting features from micro-Doppler signatures obtained
at a frequency of 9.5 GHz. Several methods suggested the use
of bistatic radar (transmitter and receiver are not collocated) by
analyzing RF signals in order to detect the presence of a drone.
A recent study [80] showed how the trail of a DJI Phantom
4 can be detected from an antenna by analyzing TV signals
7TABLE V
EFFECTIVENESS OF SENSORS TO VARIOUS ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS
Sensor’s Effectiveness for Detection
RF Optical Acoustical
Factor ActiveRadar
RF
Scanners VIS IR LiDAR
Light ! ! ! ! !
Darkness ! ! ! ! !
Noise ! ! ! ! !
Birds ! !
Adverse Weather Conditions
Drone Identification ! ! Limited !
Autonomous Drone Detection ! ! ! !
Multiple Drone Detection ! Only if drones usedifferent channels ! ! !
Only different
types of drones
Cost ! ! !
Long Range Detection ! ! Requirefocusing lens !
Immunity to NLOS ! !
Locating ! Multiple ! ! ! Multiple
transmitted from an existing TV tower, while another method
suggested using multiple antennas to receive and process the
orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) echoes
of UAV, which are originally transmitted by the nearby base
stations. Another study suggested the use of a radar [81]
by triangulating data obtained from three receivers located
linearly on a plane, 50 meters from each other (where the
middle radar is the transceiver), in order to locate drone in
space.
Radar can be used to detect and locate a drone in space.
However, radar detection can be unreliable, as adverse weather
conditions affect the reflected wavelength, distorting the wave.
Radar also fails to identify the drone type and suffers from
high false positive rates, since it cannot distinguish between
birds and drones. In addition, the type of radar that is needed
to detect drones is expensive. Due to the abovementioned
limitations only 13 out of 33 companies use radar[82], [83],
[84], [85], [86], [87], [88], [89], [90], [91], [92], [93], [94],
and eight of them [82], [85], [87], [88], [89], [90], [91], [94]
use radar in the first stage of detection and another type of
sensor in the second stage.
B. RF Scanner & Spectrum Analyzer
RF scanners and spectrum analyzers are primarily used
to detect drone radio signatures by detecting bands that are
known to be used by drones and other radio signatures. They
can be used for (1) classifying a suspicious transmission as
an FPV channel, and (2) locating a drone in space. One study
analyzed [95] the received signal strength indication (RSSI)
patterns of Wi-Fi signals for the detection of approaching,
escaping, and spying Wi-Fi drones. This method can be
applied using a simple Wi-Fi receiver, however it is only
effective when a line of sight between the Wi-Fi receiver and
drone exists, and its accuracy for detecting a drone among
other moving IoT devices that transmit Wi-Fi signals (e.g.,
smartwatch, smartphone) was not validated. Another study
[96], [97] analyzed 10 seconds of RF signals captured by SDR
and found that the RF signatures of commercial Wi-Fi drones
can be (1) detected with high accuracy (84.9%) from a distance
of 600 meters, and (2) used to identify the detected drone
type with variable accuracy (64-89%) depending on the drone.
Another study [98] used USRP to detect drones and found that
the presence of the drone can also be detected in an urban
environment, however it is challenging to observe a drone’s
RF signature when the drone more than 50 meters away
without increasing the gain of the receiver’s antenna panel.
Two studies [99], [100] used machine learning algorithms to
classify drone transmissions. Another study [101] suggested
detecting the presence of a drone by analyzing the MAC
addresses of known drones of nearby captured access points .
However, attackers can evade the suggested detection method
by changing a drone’s MAC address. RF scanners can be very
effective at detecting the presence of a drone and identifying
its type by comparing them to known used bands, however
RF scanners suffer from an inability to accurately locate a
drone in space unless they are triangulated [102]. In addition,
attackers can evade detection by using drones that transmit on
a dedicated band that is not popular for FPV use.
C. Optical
Based on cameras that detect visible frequencies , several
studies suggested methods to detect a drone and its trajectory
from a single video stream by detecting motion cues [123],
[124], visual marks [125], and shape descriptors [126]. Other
studies trained a neural network [127], [128], [129] or used
multiple fixed ground cameras [130] for the same purpose.
While the abovementioned methods can also be used to
accurately locate and identify (using a preliminary database)
drones, they suffer from false positive detections due to the
similarities between the movements of drones and birds. They
also suffer from high false negative rates due to the increasing
number of drone models, the use of non-commercial drones,
and ambient darkness.
In order to address the compromised drone detection rate
in dark conditions, several studies suggested using thermal
cameras that capture invisible wavelengths. A recent study
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CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMERCIAL DEVICES FOR DRONE DETECTION
Radio Optical Acoustic Features
Company Name Product Name Radar RFScanner Camera LiDAR
Electro-
optical
Camera
Thermal Microphone
Detection
Range
(KM)
Identification Angle Locating Mobility
3DEO
Rogue Drone
Detection &
Mitigation [103]
! 2 !
Aaronia Drone DetectionSystem [82] ! ! ! 50 ! ! !
Anti-Drone.eu GROK [83] ! 4 ! !
Droneshield [104] ! 0.5
Aveillant Gamekeeper 16U -Holographic Radar [84] ! 5 !
Black Sage - BST UAVX [85] ! ! ! 0.5 90 ! !
C speed LLC LightWave Radar [86] ! !
CACI SkyTracker [105] ! !
CerbAir DroneWatch [106] ! 1 ! !
Chess Dynamics
Ltd AUDS [87] ! ! ! 10 180 ! !
DeDrone.com DroneTracker [107] ! ! ! !
DeTect DroneWatcher [108] ! 1.6-3.2 ! !
HARRIER DSR [88] ! ! ! 3.2 ! !
Digital
Global
Systems
SigBASE [109] ! !
DroneShield FarAlert/WideAletSensors [110] ! ! 1 30 !
Gryphon Sensors Skylight [89] ! ! ! ! 3-10 360 ! !
HGH
Infrared
Systems
UAV Detection
& Tracking [111] ! ! ! 360
Kelvin Hughes
Limited
SharpEve SxV
Radar [90] ! ! ! 1.5 360 ! !
MAGNA Drone Detection [112] ! ! ! 0.5-1
Microflown AVISA Skysentry AMMS [113] ! ! 0.4-1 360 !
Mistral Solutions
Drone Detection
and Classification
System [114]
! ! ! 1 !
ORELIA Drone-Detector [115] ! 0.1 360
Quanergy Systems Q-Guard -LiDar X-Drone [116] ! 0.1
Rinicom SKY PATRIOT [117] ! ! ! 0.8 !
Rinicom and
METIS Aerospace SKYPERION [118] ! !
ROBIN
Radar
Systems
ELVIRA [91] ! ! ! !
Rohde and
Schwarz
R&S
ARDRONIS-I [119] ! 1-2 !
SAAB Group Giraffe AMBRadar - ELSS [92] ! 30-470 360 ! !
Sensofusion AIRFENCE [120] ! !
SpotterRF A2000 RadarUAVX [93] ! 0.2-1 45/90 ! !
Squarehead
Technology DiscovAir [121] !
TCI
International BlackBird [122] ! !
Thales SQUIRE [94] ! ! 48 ! !
[131] suggested using short-wave infrared (SWIR) for night
detection. Another study [132] performed a comparison of
drone detection at various distances using short-wave infrared
(SWIR), mid-wave infrared (MWIR), and long-wave infrared
(LWIR) imagers and found that (1) SWIR imagers do not
appear to be good candidates for drone detection due to their
reliance on external light sources, sensitivity to the SWIR
absorbing materials used on UAS, and frequent capturing of
fast moving and bright insects; (2) LWIR imaging may be best
suited for the detection and assessment of drones, however
nuisance sources such as birds will also be captured in the
LWIR, and certain angles above the horizon may present
challenges due to the temperature equivalence of the target
and the background; and (3) MWIR may offer better clutter
rejection, while still relying upon self-emitted photons from
targets. A recent study [133] analyzed the detection of drones
using a LiDAR sensor and found that (1) commercial drone
speed does not affect the accuracy of detection, and (2) drones
can be detected from a distance of a few hundred meters. The
greatest disadvantage associated with using an infrared camera
and LiDAR is their inability to identify a drone due to the low
resolution of captured images.
Typically, cameras that capture visible and invisible wave-
lengths are combined to support detection throughout the day
and night. In addition, 16 companies [103], [82], [85], [87],
[107], [88], [110], [89], [111], [90], [112], [114], [116], [117],
[91], [94] out of 33 companies use at least a single optical
sensor to detect drones, including electro-optical sensors which
have not been suggested in academic studies for the use of
identifying the range of a detected drone. However, both cap-
turing visible and invisible optical sensors (1) are dependent
on the line of sight, (2) require excellent focus capabilities to
9detect drones located far from the camera, (3) require multiple
cameras or a 360 camera to provide full 360 degree detection,
and (4) are not immune to adverse weather conditions.
D. Acoustic
Acoustic detection methods are not dependent on the line of
sight or the size of the target UAV , and many studies have sug-
gested the use of a microphone array to detect drones by ana-
lyzing the noise of the rotors. Other studies presented methods
used to detect drones based on comparing a drone’s captured
acoustic signature with other signatures stored in a database
of previously collected sound signatures. A recent study [134]
compared a drone’s FFT signal obtained from a microphone
using machine learning techniques, while other research [135]
used correlation for comparison. Acoustic signature collection
is a major issue for acoustic detection , however factors such
as wind, temperature, time of day, obstacles, and other sounds
can bend the sound waves, changing the direction the sound
will travel ([136]). The collection of a sound signal on a hot
day with little wind on an open plain will be significantly
different than collection of the signal on a cold, windy night
in a forest [136], [137]. Several studies suggested methods
that triangulate sound obtained from centralized [138] and
distributed [139] microphone arrays in order to detect a drone’s
direction of arrival and location. Another study [140] sug-
gested a two-layer feature extractor that can be used to detect
drones. While acoustic methods can be used to identify a drone
and locate its presence (using multiple distributed microphones
), relying on acoustic signature methods for drone detection
suffers from false negative detections due to the increasing
number of drone models and false positive detections due to
ambient noise. In addition, these methods are very limited in
their ability to detect a drone from a distance and require the
application of noise filtering techniques and calibration for
different environments [141]. The abovementioned limitations
are likely the reason that microphones are only used by eight
out of 33 companies for drone detection.
E. Hybrid
Table V presents an analysis of sensors’ ability to meet
drone detection system requirements. As can be seen, there
is no sensor capable of fulfilling all of the requirements,
confirming the findings of [142], [143]. In order to overcome
the limitations that arise from using a single sensor, many
sensor fusion methods have been suggested. Several methods
[144], [145], [146] pproposed combining acoustic and optical
methods, using (1) an acoustic camera, or (2) a camera with
a microphone array. While in [144], [145] an optical sensor
was used along with an acoustic sensor, in [146] a moving
optical sensor was positioned in the center of the secured area,
and several microphones were located outside of the area to
provide two stages of detection: direction of arrival (using
a microphone) and location (using a camera). Other studies
suggested combining optical and RF methods such as LiDAR
and radar [78]. Other research proposed the use of all three
methods (acoustic, optical, and RF) in order to detect and
locate a drone in space [147], [142], [148]. In general, using
more than a single sensor is the approach taken by 16 of 33
companies for drone detection, however the main disadvantage
of the multiple sensor approach is the total cost of applying
the method.
F. Other Methods
Other novel methods have been suggested for drone de-
tection. In [149], the authors suggested using "humans and
sensors" in order to create a collaborative network for de-
tecting drones. Their approach relies on people who use their
smartphones to capture photos of detected drones and send this
information to a centralized server. However, this approach is
not practical for real use cases.
G. Drone Detection Industry
Table VI provides a comparison of the 33 largest drone
detection companies [24] that sell commercial devices for
drone detection, comparing them based on the sensors they use
and the features they support according to their specifications.
As can be seen, 24 companies stick with traditional radio
methods (using radar or a RF scanner), 16 companies use
some type of optical sensor, and only eight companies use
acoustic methods. Eighteen companies use multiple sensors
as a means of detection . Only nine companies use sensors to
identify detected drones. We made the following interesting
observations regarding drone detection mechanisms:
• Asymmetric costs - Some of these technologies are sold
for millions of dollars [150] and are used to detect drones
that can be purchased for hundreds of dollars. In addition,
the financial damage that can be caused by a drone that
costs a few hundreds of dollars is greater (by several
orders of magnitude) than the price of a drone, as was
demonstrated in the Gatwick Airport drone incident [52]
that affected about 140,000 passengers and over 1,000
flights and other incidents.
• Different use cases require different solutions - Factors
like detection range and mobility are most likely to
determine the chosen solution.
• Variety of sizes - Some detection mechanisms are the
size of a suitcase, while others are much larger (half the
size of a car) and require a number of operators.
• Modular products - Their systems can work based on a
single sensor but also support adding additional sensors.
However, as was proven in many cases, detecting a drone is
a major challenge, even for commercial drones whose radio,
acoustic, and visual signatures are published or can be learned.
An attacker that would like to exploit this fact to evade drone
detection mechanisms may try to use a drone with a different
signature by building his/her own drone or changing a drone’s
signatures (visual and radio).
V. MALICIOUS DRONE DETECTION IN NON-RESTRICTED
FLIGHT AREAS
In no-flight zones, a drone is considered dangerous/mali-
cious based its location, so systems that are aimed at detecting
and locating a drone (e.g., radar, LiDAR, etc.) can provide
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Fig. 4. Spying classification problem - legitimate and illegitimate use of a drone from the same location: (a) a drone boxed in yellow, two people boxed in
green, and the window of an organization boxed in red, (b) illegitimate use of the drone camera to film the organization, (c) legitimate use of the drone for
selfie purposes. Identification problem - when all drones look identical (d), it is difficult to match virtual IDs to physical drones in the camera view.
a solution. However, detecting a malicious drone in non-
restricted areas remains a challenge [151], [152]. Many coun-
tries around the world allow drones to fly in populated/urban
areas [19], [37] as part of a new "open skies" policy. This
policy has encouraged an increasing number of organizations
to adopt drones for various legitimate purposes. Drones are
currently used for pizza delivery [4], the shipment of goods
[5], filming [6], and many other legitimate purposes [43].
Allowing drones to fly in populated areas has created two
main challenges : purpose detection problem and identification
problem. Given that we are living in an era in which drones
are flying among us, we argue that there is major scientific
gap in the area of malicious drone detection in non-restricted
flight areas, particularly in light of the challenges that have
arisen as a result of the increased use and freedom of drones.
A. Purpose Detection Problem
The greatest challenge stemming from allowing drones to
fly in populated areas is detecting the drone’s purpose. This
problem has significant impact in several areas, the best-known
of which is privacy: drones are being used by their operators to
conduct privacy invasion attacks, in which they spy on people
and other targets [7], [8], [9], [10], [11].
More specifically, given a drone that is passing near a
house,how can we tell whether the drone is being used for
a legitimate purpose (e.g., delivering pizza) or an illegiti-
mate purpose (e.g., taking a peek at a person showering
in his/her own house)? The use of traditional geofencing
methods (e.g., radar, LiDAR) as a means of detecting a
privacy invasion attack in non-restricted areas (e.g., residential
neighborhoods) will fail to distinguish between the legitimate
use of a nearby drone and illegitimate use that invades an
individual’s privacy. This distinction can only be made based
on the orientation of the drone’s video camera rather than
on the drone’s location; more specifically, differentiation be-
tween illegitimate and legitimate use of a drone can only be
accomplished by determining the exact POI (point of interest)
being streamed over the video channel and not according to
the drone’s location, as demonstrated in Figure 4.
A recent study from NDSS 2017 [95] suggested a method
for detecting a privacy invasion attack based on a drone’s
flight behavior. They observed that a privacy invasion attack
conducted by an operator that is located far from the target
(e.g., one kilometer) consists of three unique flying episodes
: approaching the target, spying on the target, and escaping
from the target. Based on this observation, they suggested
detecting the correlative radio patterns from a static radio
receiver by analyzing the RSSI of its FPV channel. However,
as was indicated in a recent study from S&P 2019 [153], this
approach cannot be used to detect whether a specific POI is
being filmed, as demonstrated in Figure 4a.
In order to detect whether a specific POI is being filmed,
a recent study from S&P 2019 suggested a cryptanalysis
approach [151], [152]. The authors found that they could
influence the number of transmitted packets being sent from
a Wi-Fi FPV drone (e.g., DJI Spark, Parrot Bebop 2, Parrot
Anafi, etc.) over its FPV channel by using an LED flicker
and exploiting the drone’s video compression process. They
showed that with each on/off change of a flicker at a given
frequency, a larger amount of data is sent over the FPV
channel, causing a watermark to be added to the FPV channel
that can be detected by analyzing the frequency [153] and time
[151] domains via a network interface card possessed by static
1 and moving targets 2.
However, currently the suggested cryptanalysis approach
is limited to Wi-Fi FPV drones and can be bypassed by
eliminating the video compression stage or by using two video
cameras. Currently, no other methods have been suggested
to determine whether a passing drone is being used for a
legitimate/illegitimate purpose, and as mentioned earlier, there
is a major scientific gap in this area.
B. Identification Problem
The second problem created by allowing drones to fly in
populated areas is referred to as the identification problem
[154]. Identifying a drone, i.e., determining the association
between drones’ physical IDs (such as the drone’s MAC
address) and visual IDs (such as object tracker output) is
an unresolved issue with major impact. For example, given
several drones hovering near each other that were captured
by a video camera and radio receiver (e.g., radar, spectrum
1 https://youtu.be/4icQwducz68
2 https://youtu.be/9PVaDpMsyQE
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analyzer), hhow can we distinguish between a foe drone
(used to carry a bomb or to spy) and a friend drone
(used by a farmer to fertilize its corps) in cases which
both drones are identical? Even if the detected drones use
a radio-based authentication protocol (e.g., transmitting their
MAC IDs) to identify themselves, we cannot determine a foe
from a friend. This problem is illustrated in Figure 4d.
Existing "friend or foe" [155] identification methods are
widely used by militaries to authenticate their airplanes in
order to detect a rival airplane, however, as can be seen in
Figure 4 [154], these methods are not effective for drones due
to the fact that a friend and a foe drone can be located too near
to each other at the same altitude and GPS location. Therefore,
even if the GPS location of a friend is known, it cannot be used
to distinguish between friend and foe drones that are located
a few centimeters from each other given the known average
4.5 meter GPS error under open skies [156]. A recent study
[154] suggested a way of identifying each drone by matching
the motion detected through their inertial sensors and from
an external camera . However, this method requires additional
hardware that can obtain data from sensors and broadcast it to
a drone detection mechanism using a transmitter. This method
can be effective for military purposes [154], however it cannot
be used to authenticate/identify most commercial drones, since
they do not support broadcasting their sensors’ data, and out-
of-band solutions to authenticate drones remain a gap.
The scientific gap in this area can be exploited for various
purposes by malicious entities, particularly in areas in which
drone flight is permitted. Due to the inability to distinguish
between a friend and foe, in the domain of physical attacks,
for example, terrorists can fly a drone equipped with a bomb
in order to assassinate world leaders [16] or launch a multiple
casualty incident [62], [63]. Other domains, including smug-
gling and cyber-attacks, are also affected by this scientific gap.
Considering the fact that drones do not support the func-
tionality to authenticate and identify themselves, the ability
to detect smuggling attempts and cyber-attack remains a
challenge [54], [55]. Given a drone that is being used to
launch a cyber-attack, how can we identify this drone if
its operator disguised the drone as an aerial pizza delivery
drone? We demonstrate a new type of cyber warfare against
smart cities that triggers watering via a cellular smart irrigation
system while disguised as a Domino’s Pizza delivery drone.
In addition, some organizations deploy drones on their
premises in order to transport packages between buildings that
are located some distance from one other. This can easily be
exploited by attackers to spy on the organization without being
detected using the same type of drone that is used by the
organization.
VI. ATTACKS AGAINST DRONES & COUNTERMEASURES
In this section, we review methods used to attack drones.
Attacks against drones can result in the following:
• Hijacking - The attacker gains complete control of the
drone.
• Denial-of-Service - The attacker causes the drone to
one of the following results: crashing, landing, drifting,
disabling the operator the video link.
• Violating confidentiality - The attacker can determine
whether a specific point of interest is being video
streamed by the drone.
In addition, we also review countermeasures methods against
the attacks.
A. Protocol-Based Attacks & Countermeasures
In this subsection, we review attacks that exploit protocol
vulnerabilities. Older drone generations that were manufac-
tured by Parrot were based on Wi-Fi FPV that did not
require any authentication to join the network (open access
points). Several studies [21], [157], [159] applied traditional
methods against open access points and presented two DOS
attacks against these drones by (1) applying a deauthentication
attack [157], [158], and (2) flooding the drone’s NIC [159].
Performing a hijacking attack after the deauthentication attack
stage was also suggested by [157]. Another study [158] found
that the FTP folder that stores images and videos captured by
Parrot drones does not require any authentication and deleted
files from the FTP folder. However, the abovementioned
methods can only be applied to older Parrot drones models
as new Parrot drones support WPA-2 with authentication;
therefore, as long as the joining password has not been leaked,
the abovementioned attacks cannot be applied on newer Parrot
drones. Two studies demonstrated methods for hijacking a
drone using a replay attack that was applied from a malicious
GCS against weak uplinks of FPV channels (Figure 2). A
novel study [160] presented techniques used to hijack a $30k
drone used by police departments by exploiting the XBee
868LP protocol using replaying maneuvering commands that
are sent over 868 MHz from the GCD to the drone. Another
study [161] showed that amateur drones whose uplinks are
based on the MAVLink protocol and can be found on amateur
drones (e.g., 3DR IRIS+, Erle-Copter) can also be hijacked
using a replay attack. However, a recent [162] study showed
that malicious replay attacks can be detected by authenticating
the drone’s operator via measurements obtained from motion
sensors using machine learning algorithms.
B. Sensor-Based Attacks & Countermeasures
As described in Section II, drones contain motion sensors,
obstacle avoidance sensors, cameras, and many other sensors
that are important for real-time maneuvering. In this subsec-
tion, we review sensor-based attacks, which are also known as
spoofing attacks. The MEMS gyroscope and accelerometers
are sensitive to ultrasound at their resonance frequency, and
attacks targeting this vulnerability have been demonstrated in
many studies [176], [177] and was demonstrated in an article
from USENIX 2015 by [168] where the authors spoofed a
drone’s gyroscope output to maximum values, forcing the
drone to land. However, this type of attack requires pow-
erful speakers and is very limited in its range, since sound
deteriorates with distance. A recent paper from CCS 2018
[169] proposed a software solution for the acoustic attack
that was presented at USENIX 2015 [168]. The authors
implemented a software-based solution for control invariant
checking and demonstrated that sensor spoofing attacks that
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TABLE VII
ANTI DRONE METHODS COMPARISON
Methods Effectiveness Results & Countermeasures
Type Wi-Fi FPVDrones
Proprietary FPV
Drone
LOS
Independent
Denial of
Service
Aerial
Hijacking
Violating
Confidentiality Countermeasure
Protocol
Deauthentication [157], [158] ! ! ! !
Using WPAFlooding NIC [159] ! ! !
Deleting Stored
Videos [158] ! !
Replay
Attacks [160], [161] ! ! !
Operator’s
Authentication [162]
Detecting Captured
POI [151] ! !
Disabling Video
Compression
Spoofing
Sensors
Camera [163] ! ! Shifting
GPS
[164], [165], [158] ! ! !
Force
Landing
During RTH
Mission
Anti GPS
Spoofing [166], [167]
Motion
Sensors [168] ! ! ! Landing
Software Based
Solution [169]
Magnometer [158] ! ! ! ForceCalibration
Compromised
Component
Fake
Propeller [170] ! ! ! Crashing
Parachute
[171], [172], [173]
Compromised
Firmware [174], [164] ! ! !
Using a
Backdoor
Control Flow
Approach [175]
Jammers GPS [158] ! ! !
Drifting, Loss
of Control
FPV Channel [164] ! ! ! DisablingFPV
Physical
Attacks
Nets ! ! Landing,Crashing
Bullets ! ! Crashing Parachute[171], [172], [173]
Lasers ! ! Crashing Mirrors, Smoke
Missiles ! ! Crashing
Predator Birds ! ! Landing
result in anomalous measurements obtained from a drone’s
sensors can be detected by comparing a measurement that was
obtained from a sensor to a measurement that was predicted
by their framework. Another study [163] demonstrated a
method of hijacking a drone by spoofing its downward camera
and influencing the stabilizing algorithm (which is based on
detecting movement changes from a video stream) by directing
a laser and projector to the surface of a flying drone. A few
studies [164], [165], [158], [178], [179] presented a method
for hijacking and disabling a drone using GPS spoofing (1) of
no-fly zones, (2) during autonomous navigation to a target. In
order to detect GPS spoofing attacks, various software [166],
[167] and hardware-based solutions for drones were adopted
from prior knowledge that exists in this area . Another study
[158] found that the presence of a magnetic field near the
DJI Phantom 3 always necessitated recalibration of the drone’s
compass prior to takeoff.
C. Compromised Component & Countermeasures
Recently, a new type of attack targeted at drones was
suggested by [170], [174], [164] based on compromising
their hardware/software. A recent study [170] demonstrated a
supply chain attack against drone hardware using a propeller
that is visually identical to a genuine propeller but crashes
the drone upon takeoff. Two other studies suggested attacks
against drone software. In [174], the researcher installed
malware on a drone’s firmware and used it to open a backdoor.
In [164], the researcher reverse engineered DJI’s SDK and
escalated its permissions in order to create a C&C application
for smartphones which is used to control the drone. Compro-
mising a drone’s software can be accomplished with a supply
chain attack or via the Internet by compromising a drone’s
Internet connected GCD (e.g., a smartphone) with malware or
a fake application. A recent study [175] suggested a control
flow integrity approach to detect attacks against software. They
implemented their approach on the ArduPilot OS and showed
that it was capable of detecting attacks such as buffer overflow
attacks and illegal executions of functions.
D. Jammers
Several studies have suggested disrupting incoming/outgo-
ing communication using jammers. One study showed that
applying GPS jamming [158] to drones results in drifting and
difficulty controlling the drone, and prevents the return to
home functionality from working. Another study applied radio
jamming [164] against a video link channel and showed that
the FPV functionality was disabled in the GCD , preventing the
operator from maneuvering the drone with no LOS. Jammers
are one of the most commonly used products for disabling a
drone on the market. Some commercial anti-drone jammers
are directional RF transmitters in the form of mobile shooting
guns that apply jamming to GPS signals and ISM bands known
to be used by drones [180], [181], [182], [183], [184], [185],
[186]. Other jammers are stationary devices [187], [188],
[189], [190]. A jammer’s ability relies on the strength of its
radio transmitter, however the best jammer on the market is
effective at ranges of up to two kilometers.
E. Physical Attacks & Countermeasures
A physical attack is the most common means of disabling
drones used by the industrial sector. Several companies utilize
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nets to disable and crash drones. Such nets are connected to
drones that swoop and swag malicious drones or fire a shot
from the air (using another drone) [191], [192], [193], [194],
[195], or the ground (using a gun) [196], [197], [198], [199].
The net stops the propellers from turning and causes the drone
to fall and crash to the ground. One company [200] sells
predator birds (eagles and falcons) that have been trained to
detect, capture, and land drones. Other companies sell vehicles
equipped with laser guns and cannons that irradiate a directed
high energy laser beam that causes a drone to burn in the
air and fall to the ground [201], [202]. We also note that an
army has used a $3 million Patriot missile to shoot down
a drone [203]. Since physical attacks can cause the drone
to crash and in so doing harm people (in populated areas
that allow drone flight) and cause damage to facilities and
the drone itself, several companies sell a dedicated parachute
for drones (e.g., DJI Inspire 1 and 2, DJI Phantom 2-4, DJI
Matrice) [171], [172], [173]. Some of the parachutes contain
an automatic trigger system that is designed to open the
parachute if the drone falls , while others are manually opened
by the drone operator (based on the RF controller). Some
parachutes activate an audio buzzer to warn bystanders to
move out of harm’s way.
VII. FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
In this section, we suggest future research directions in areas
in which a scientific gap exists. We include suggestions that
can be applied in order to detect attacks caused by malicious
operators who will not follow regulations and laws.
A. Suggestions for Authenticating Drones and Operators
Methods for authenticating drones based on a white-listing
approach must be introduced in order to solve the identification
problem (i.e., detecting a specific drone among similar drones).
For example, one interesting method that can be used for this
purpose as an out-of-band solution is installing a microcon-
troller on a group of white-listed drones. In this case, the
microcontroller will serve as a transmitter for authenticating
the drone by modulating an RSA token using visual cues (e.g.,
using an LED strip); the visual cues will be captured by a
video camera connected to a computer that will analyze the
frames in the video stream and interpret the series of visual
modulations to an RSA token . Based on the result, it will
decide to authenticate the drone or not. We also hypothesize
whether drone operators can be authenticated based on their
flying skills captured via a third party static radio receiver
by analyzing a drone’s radio emissions. While authenticating
a drone operator has already been suggested using an on
board approach (which we do not consider a third party
approach), we propose using the method introduced in [204]
for authenticating smartphone users in indoor environments
via a laptop’s network interface card by analyzing the channel
state information of the Wi-Fi protocol . are based on replay
attacks by analyzing the received signal strength indication
(RSSI) of a radio command that was sent from another GCS
(i.e., if the difference in the received signal strength indication
between two consecutive commands is over a predefined
threshold, the received command will be ignored).
B. Suggestions for Dealing with Cyber-Attacks on Drones
While detecting a cyber-attack against drones is difficult,
trying to deal with the repercussions of cyber-attacks is much
harder. For example, even if a sensor-based attack has been
detected, securing the drone or returning it home safely is
a complex problem if the drone’s system cannot rely on
the measurements from the integrated sensors (e.g., GPS,
gyroscope). In order to deal with this problem, we hypothesize
how accurate will be a software-based mechanism that stores
the history of the series of maneuvering commands (from the
time the drone has takeoff until a sensor-based attack has been
identified, e.g., using the technique suggest by [169]). When an
attack (e.g., a hybrid GPS spoofing and FPV jamming attack)
that prevents the drone from flying according to the commands
sent from its operator (due to FPV jamming) and automatically
returning home (due to GPS spoofing) has been detected, the
drone can return to its takeoff location by traversing its series
of maneuvering commands from the last command (when
the attack was identified) to the first command (takeoff) and
performing the opposite of each of the commands.
C. Suggestions for Determining a Drone’s Intention
Other mechanisms for detecting the purpose of a drone
based on its flight behavior must also be introduced. For
example, we hypothesize whether the cellular hijacking that
was demonstrated in our video can be detected by analyzing
the radio activity of known cellular bands using a spectrum
analyzer and intersecting the origin of the cellular transmitter
with the location of a detected drone.
D. Open Questions
One important question that requires a solution is how to
detect and locate the operator of a malicious drone given the
fact that such malicious operators will not follow regulations,
such as installing a form of identification on a drone or
registering its unique identifier in a national database, even
if such regulations are instituted. In addition, we hypothesize
whether there is a method for creating a unique signature for
each drone that cannot be changed or copied (for example, a
dedicated acoustic signature resulting from the manufacturing
process of a drone’s rotor).
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